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Dean's opinion is bereft of references to basic American 
Indian law doctrine, including the so-called "canons of 
construction" that often play a controlling role in this 
area.7 
If Warbus were a throwaway case, it would deserve 
little notice. But it isn't. Warbus is a published opinion 
of the Tax Court, and it's intended to have precedential 
effect.8 Since section 7873 hasn't been the subject of 
prior judicial decisions, Warbus could have enormous 
effect in developing the understanding of that section.9 
Even more important, Warbus could come to stand for 
the proposition that the Tax Court can ignore American 
Indian law principles in tax disputes that involve In-
dian tribes or Indian tribal members. 
I'll show why none of that should happen. Warbus 
deserves to be discarded as precedent for at least two 
reasons. First, as I've noted, the opinion shows no 
awareness of fundamental American Indian law prin-
ciples. Second, the decision is flawed even in its nar-
row, more technical aspects. The court did an inade-
quate job on the issues that should have been evident 
to any tax lawyer reading section 7873. In fact, the 
judge misread the statute. 
I Warbus deserves to be discarded as precedent for at least two reasons. 
I emphasize that my criticisms of Warbus are based 
on professional concerns about the opinion and what 
it could mean for the development of the law. I'm afraid 
that at times I may seem unfair to Judge Dean. Many 
of the problems in the opinion weren't his fault. Judge 
Dean received little or no guidance from the litig~nts 
on some critical points, especially the basics of 
American Indian law. But regardless of where the fault 
lies, strong criticism is necessary to demonstrate why 
7 See infra Part II A. 
8There's a never-ending dispute within the Tax Court 
about the precedential effect of the court's not-officially-pub-
lished "memorandum opinions," which "are supposed to be 
limited to those having no value as precedent [(i.e.,] any case 
decided solely upon the authority of another, cases involving 
subjects already well covered by opinions appearing in the 
bound volumes of the reports, failure of proof cases and some 
others." J. Edgar Murdock, "What Has the Tax Court of the 
United States Been Doing?," 31 A.B.A. J. 297, 299 (1945); see 
Mark F. Sommer & Anne D. Waters, "Tax Court Memoran-
dum Opinions What Are They Worth?" Tax Notes, July 20, 
1998, p. 384; see also Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: 
Challenges and Reform 163 n.9 (1996) (collecting commentary). 
Whatever the value of memorandum opinions, however, a 
published opinion like Warbus is unquestionably precedent. 
9The only published authority on section 7873 before War bus 
was Notice 89-34, 1989-1 C.B. 674, which set out the govern-
ment's position on some matters that aren't directly relevant 
to this article. In Kieffer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-202, 
Doc 98-17481 (9 pages), 98 TNT 106-14, decided shortly after 
Warbus, Judge Dean had occasion to cite section 7873 once 
again, concluding inter alia- in what must be the least con-
troversial ruling of the year- that income from timber sales 
is not income from a "fishing rights-related activity." 
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Warbus should be disregarded in later disputes arising 
from the intersection of American Indian law and 
federal tax law. 
I. Warbus v. Commissioner: The Facts and the Code 
Around 1984, Warbus, a member of the Lummi Na-
tion, bought a fishing boat, the Denis.e W, a purchase 
financed partly through borrowing from a commercial 
lender and partly by Warbus's note issued to the boat's 
former owner. In 1984, Warbus borrowed another 
$50,000 from the commercial lender, a loan secured by 
the Denise W.10 The proceeds were used, among other 
things, to acquire a salmon net, to make a payment on 
the earlier loan, and to make insurance and mortgage 
payments.11 The Bureau of Indian Affairs guaranteed 
the $50,000 loan.12 
From 1986 until1991, Warbus was engaged in tribal 
fishing activity protected by the Treaty of Point El-
liott, 13 and Warbus used the Denise W in that activity. 
However, around 1993, Warbus defaulted on the 
$50,000 loan. The boat was repossessed, and in 1993 
BIA had to fulfill its obligation as guarantor, paying 
over $13,506, partly principal and partly interest, to the 
lender. The BIA sent Warbus the appropriate form (a 
"1099") to indicate that he had $13,506 in DOI income.14 
Warbus didn't report the DOI income. In fact, he 
didn't file a tax return or pay estimated taxes for 1993.15 
Since Warbus conceded that he had had rental income 
of $6,000 and self-employment income of $3,700 in that 
year, and he therefore unquestionably owed some tax, 
Warbus wasn't the most sympathetic litigant.l6 Never-
theless, although the fisherman's hands weren't very 
clean, the proper tax treatment of the DOl income was 
a legitimate issue on its own. 
Under traditional tax analysis, Warbus had taxable 
income from the discharge of indebtedness. He had 
borrowed money tax-free, and later he was relieved of 
the obligation to repay some of the borrowed dollars. 
10Warbus, 110 T.C. at 280. 
11 Id. at 280-81. 
12Id. at 281. 
13The treaty was signed in 1855 by the United States and 
a number of tribes, including the Lummi Nation, in the 
Washington Territory, and was ratified by the Senate in 1859. 
Treaty Between the United States and the Dwamish, Su-
quamish, and Other Allied and Subordinate Tribes of Indians 
in Washington Territory, 12 Stat. 927 (1859). Article V pro-
vides: 
The right of taking fish at usual and accustomed 
grounds and stations is further secured to said Indians 
in common with all citizens of the Territory, and of 
erecting temporary houses for the purpose of curing, 
together with the privilege of hunting and gathering 
roots and berries on open and unclaimed lands. Pro-
vided, however, that they shall not take shell-fish from 
any beds staked or cultivated by citizens. 
Id. at 928. 
14Warbus, 110 T.C. at 281. 
15Jd. 
16Trial Memorandum for Respondent, Warbus v. Commis-
sioner, 110 T.C. 279 (No. 2194-96). 
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That's the classic scenario for DOI income: you don't 
have to report the dollars when received because 
you're obligated to pay them back. However, if you're 
later released from the payback obligation, you then 
have income. In effect, DOI income represents a 
deferred inclusion of previously untaxed loan 
proceeds. 
There may have been a discharge of indebtedness, 
or something substantively similar,17 but Warbus could 
point to a special Internal Revenue Code section that 
arguably applied to his situation. Section 7873, added 
to the code in 1988, provides in pertinent part that "no 
tax shall be imposed ... on income derived ... by a 
member of an Indian tribe directly or through a qual-
ified Indian entity ... from a fishing rights-related 
activity of such tribe."18 
That's my case, argued Warbus. And the govern-
ment conceded that, between 1986 and 1991, Warbus 
was engaged in a "fishing rights-related activity": "any 
activity directly related to harvesting, processing, or 
transporting fish harvested in the exercise of a recog-
nized fishing right of [an Indian] tribe or to selling such 
fish but only if substantially all of such harvesting was 
performed by members of such tribe. "19 In general, 
"recognized fishing rights" means "fishing rights 
secured ... by a treaty between [the] tribe and the 
United States or by an Executive order or an Act of 
Congress"20 - exactly the sort of rights reserved to the 
Lummi Nation by the Treaty of Point Elliott. 21 
For section 7873 to exempt income from taxation, 
therefore, (1) a fishing rights-related activity must be 
in operation, and (2) the income at issue must be 
"derived directly from" that activity. 22 The protected 
activity was conceded to exist in Warbus. If the DOI 
income was sufficiently connected to the treaty-
protected fishing activity, Warbus should have 
prevailed. 
17Not everyone would characterize what happened in War-
bus as generating DOl income. The lender was paid by BIA; 
the lender didn't forgive Warbus's obligation. Nevertheless, 
I'll use the term "DOl" in this article for two reasons. First, 
the parties and the court used the term. Second, the transac-
tion can be reconceptualized as DOl because BIA stepped into 
the lender's shoes. Warbus effectively came to owe BIA the 
$13,506, an obligation that was then forgiven. In any event, 
however one labels the theory for inclusion, there was unques-
tionably income to Warbus under traditional notions when 
BIA satisfied Warbus's obligation. 
18Section 7873( a)(1 ). 
19Section 7873(b )(1 ). 
20Section 7873(b )(2). 
21 See supra note 13. 
22The full text of section 7873(a)(1) refers to "income 
derived directly or through a qualified Indian entity." A "qual-
ified Indian entity" is generally an entity that is formed by a 
tribe to engage in a qualified fishing activity and that meets 
certain specific, technical requirements- e.g., that "all of the 
equity interests in the entity are owned by qualified Indian 
tribes, members of such tribes, or their spouses." Section 
7873(b)(3)(A)(ii). Judge Dean concluded that the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs is not such a qualified entity and that this 
alternative route to exemption was therefore unavailable to 
Warbus. I don't dispute that part of the opinion. 
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II. How the Warbus Court Erred 
The issue in Warbus, simply stated, was this: Was 
the DOI income of Warbus "income derived ... directly 
... from" an activity that was conceded to be "a fishing 
rights-related activity" of the Lummi Nation? 
When I first saw squibs describing Warbus, my 
response to this question was "Why not?" Warbus used 
the Denise W in a tribal activity that the government 
agreed was a fishing rights-related activity, and the 
DOI arose from the foreclosure of that boat. After 
studying the issue, my response- now, I hope, a bit 
more thoughtful - is still "Why not?" 
I If the DOl income was sufficiently connected to the treaty-protected fishing activity, Warbus should have prevailed. 
As I understand Judge Dean's opinion, he had two 
basic problems with Warbus's arguments: First, there 
was no express exemption of the DOI income from 
taxation and, second, the income was not closely 
enough connected with the treaty-protected activity. 
In a moment I'll show why each of these is a non-
problem. But first, to set the stage, I'll briefly describe 
the so-called "canons of construction" in American In-
dian law, canons that should have informed Judge 
Dean's opinion. IfWarbus's arguments had any merit 
at all, the canons should have made his position a sure 
winner. 
A. Canons of Construction 
American Indian law is full of ambiguity: ancient 
treaties and statutes don't speak in modern terms. This 
problem isn't a new one- the relationship of treaty 
and statutory language to everyday usage has always 
been tenuous at best23 - and long ago judges 
developed a set of principles, the so-ca,lled "canons of 
construction," to deal with the inherent ambiguity in 
this field. 
The canons originated in treaty interpretation. 
Treaties with the Indian tribes have often been likened 
to contracts of adhesion, the powerful United States 
imposing its will on the relatively weak and powerless 
tribes. Everything, including the language used in the 
"negotiations" and final document, favored the United 
States at the expense of the tribes. To implement those 
treaties in a fair and reasonable way, judges must try 
to understand what the affected tribal officials thought 
they were agreeing to, or would have thought if they 
had been able to imagine the nature of twentieth cen-
tury controversies, regardless of the actual treaty lan-
guage used. As Chief Justice John Marshall made the 
point in Worcester v. Georgia/4 
23See generally Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, 
"Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: 'As Long as 
Water Flows or Grass Grows Upon the Earth' - How Long a 
Time is That?" 63 Cal. L. Rev. 601 (1975). 
2431 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).. 
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The language used in treaties with the Indians 
should never be construed to their prejudice. If 
words be made use of, which are susceptible of a 
more extended meaning than their plain import, as 
connected with the tenor of the treaty, they should 
be considered as used only in the latter sense.25 
More recently, the Court has concluded that "[d]oubt-
ful expressions are to be resolved in favor of the weak 
and defenseless people who are the wards of the na-
tion, dependent upon its protection and good faith."26 
If there is a question about whether 
ambiguity exists, the canons point 
toward finding an ambiguity, one that 
must then be resolved favorably to 
Indian interests. 
That principle has remained the law. The canons are 
phrased in different ways in different cases, but the 
basic tenets remain: Try to understand provisions as 
the unlettered Indians would have understood them; 
if there is doubt, resolve the doubt in favor of the tribes; 
and so on. In general, whatever the language used, the 
canons encompass the following points: "1) very liberal 
construction to determine whether Indian rights exist; 
and 2) very strict construction to determine whether 
Indian rights are to be abridged or abrogated."27 
Chief Justice Marshall was writing about interpret-
ing treaties in Worcester, but the canons have been ex-
tended since his day to apply to the interpretation of 
statutes, executive orders, and regulations as well. This 
isn't a matter of choice: judges are obligated to follow 
the canons. Accordingly, if there is doubt about the 
language in legal authority affecting Indian rights, that 
doubt must be resolved in a way favorable to the af-
fected tribe or the affected tribal member. It wouldn't 
be overstating matters much to say that, in disputes 
arising from the interpretation of treaties, statutes, and 
other documents, if a court sees ambiguity in the 
relevant language, the position of the tribe or the tribal 
member will prevail. 28 
In fact, the cap.ons ought to apply in determining 
whether there is an ambiguity needing resolution.29 It's 
entirely consistent with the canons as they have 
25Id. at 582. 
26Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930). 
27David H. Getches, et al., Federal Indian Law: Cases and 
Materials 348 (3d ed. 1993). 
28Tribal interests and the interests of individual tribal 
members may not coincide in particular cases. For present 
purposes, I put that real problem to the side; no such conflict 
existed in Warbus. 
29Similar debates occur in connection with "plain mean-
ing" theories of statutory interpretation. How much am-
biguity is necessary before a court may look at something 
other than the statutory language? How plain must a "plain 
meaning" be? Of course, critics of plain-meaning doctrines 
suggest that judicial adherents of the doctrine see plain 
meaning only when doing so leads to the desired interpreta-
tion. See William D. Popkin, "Law-Making Responsibility 
and Statutory Interpretation," 68 Ind. L.J. 865, 875-80 (1993). 
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developed to require courts to look for ways to inter-
pret controlling language in favor of the affected tribe 
or tribal member. Put another way: If there is a question 
about whether ambiguity exists, the canons point 
toward finding an ambiguity, one that must then be 
resolved favorably to Indian interests. 
The application of the canons may not always be 
clear, and judges have circumvented the canons by 
purporting to find no ambiguity in inherently am-
biguous documents. However, even when that hap-
pens, judges typically acknowledge the existence of the 
canons and explain why the canons don't affect the 
result.30 The canons, after all, are part of the law. To 
altogether ignore the canons, and to make no attempt 
to honor their commands, is unacceptable in a late 
twentieth century American Indian law case. 
But that's what happened in Warbus. 
There's no particular reason to expect a Tax Court 
judge to be aware of the canons. Judges need help in 
understanding areas of the law with which they are 
unfamiliar, but Judge Dean was left to his own devices. 
Other than citing cases in which the canons had been 
discussed,31 the parties gave Judge Dean no hint of the 
canons' existence.32 The fault was not the judge's, but 
his innocence does not make Warbus any more 
palatable as authority. 
B. Taxability Presumption; Its Relationship to Indians 
With the American Indian law canons of construc-
tion as a backdrop, I now examine Judge Dean's 
problems with War bus's argument. 
It's not the case, noted Judge Dean, that a Native 
American's income is presumed to be exempt from 
federal taxation. Quite the contrary. The judge wrote, 
"Tax exemptions, including those affecting native 
peoples, are not granted by implication. If Congress 
intends to exempt certain income, it must do so ex-
pressly."33 
That tax exemptions cannot be granted by implica-
tion is a generally unobjectionable proposition, and 
American Indians are federal taxpayers, except in spe-
cial situations.34 But it's not clear what that proposition 
30See, e.g., County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands 
of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 263 (1992) (applying 
canons generously to forbid ~xcise tax on sale of fee land 
within reservation boundaries while generally downplaying 
effect of canons in concluding that ad valorem tax on such 
lands was permissible). 
31 E.g., Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956); see infra notes 
36-48 and accompanying text. 
32Indeed, Warbus's Reply Brief credited the commissioner 
with having "recite[d] an unexceptional history of the inter-
section of Indian Law with Tax Law," even though there had 
been no mention of the canons in the government's brief. 
Petitioner's Reply Brief at 2-3, Warbus v. Commissioner, 110 
T.C. 279 (1998) (No. 2194-96). There was no recitation of the 
canons, even in boilerplate form, in any brief. 
33Warbus, 110 T.C. at 282-83. 
34For example, a treaty might protect members of a par-
ticular tribe from having to pay otherwise applicable federal 
taxes, or a statute like section 7873 could exempt all of a tribal 
member's income. 
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has to do with the Warbus facts. The claim wasn't that 
Warbus's income was automatically outside the reach 
of the code; such a claim would have been a sure loser.35 
The claim was that section 7873 is the express exemp-
tion that Congress has the power to grant. Facing a 
plausible argument that a specific, express exemption 
existed, Judge Dean should have parsed the statutory 
language carefully to see whether section 7873 applied 
to Warbus. Had he also been better advised about his 
obligations in an American Indian law case, he should 
have examined the statutory language with the canons 
of construction in mind. 
I Squire v. Capoeman was no ordinary tax case. 
That's what the Supreme Court did in the 1956 case 
Squire v. Capoeman,36 which dealt with the tax liability 
of an Indian couple. The Capoemans claimed exemp-
tion from federal income taxation on the proceeds of 
timber sold from their allotted lands - lands for which 
they hadn't yet been issued a patent in fee simple.37 
Simply put, the government's primary position in 
Squire was that, as American citizens, the Capoemans 
35Warbus, 110 T.C. at 282-83. In fact, in three cases decided 
before the enactment of section 7873, the Tax Court had held 
that income from treaty-protected fishing activities was tax-
able. See Estate of Peterson v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 249, 252, 88 
TNT 33-17 (1988); Earl v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 1014, 1020 
(1982); Strom v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 621, 628 (1946), aff'd per 
curiam, 158 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1947). Congress sidestepped the 
status of pre-section 7873 fishing income: "Nothing in the 
amendments [establishing section 7873] shall create any in-
ference as to the existence or non-existence or scope of any 
exemption from tax for income derived from fishing rights 
secured as of March 17, 1988 .... " Technical and Miscel-
laneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, section 
3044(b), 102 Stat. 3342, 3642. I'm not sure those cases were 
correctly decided, but that doesn't matter for this analysis. To 
say that Warbus' s income might have been taxable had there 
been no 1988 tax legislation is not to say it should have been 
taxable with section 7873 on the books. 
36351 u.s. 1 (1956). 
37Id. at 3. This isn't the place for an extended discussion 
of allotment. It's enough for present purposes to understand 
the following: Congress in the late nineteenth century 
enacted a number of allotment laws, which were intended to 
break up the Indian land mass and convert the American 
Indians into yeoman farmers. When applicable, the acts "al-
lotted" 80 or 160 acre parcels to individual Indians. The par-
cels were to stay in trust until the passage of a certain period 
of time or until the Indian became "competent," i.e., was 
deemed fit to become a citizen, at which time the individual 
was to be issued a patent for the land by the federal govern-
ment. In most cases, the land passed out of Indian hands 
altogether; the allotment acts were disastrous for American 
Indians as a whole. But in many particular cases the trust 
period was extended. Since 1934 no patents have been issued 
for allotted lands; lands held in trust at that time have con-
tinued to be held in trust. The Capoemans held land that had 
been allotted to Mr. Capoeman, and they therefore had a 
special tie to that land. But they didn't have, and would never 
have, fee simple title. Id. at 4. 
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were subject to federal income taxation. As the Court 
explained, "The government urges us to view this case 
as an ordinary tax case without regard to the treaty, 
relevant statutes, congressional policy concerning In-
dians, or the guardian-ward relationship between the 
United States and these particular Indians."38 While it's 
true, wrote Chief Justice Warren, that "in ordinary af-
fairs of life, not governed by treaties or remedial legis-
lation, [Indians] are subject to the payment of income 
taxes as are other citizens,"39 Squire v. Capoeman was 
no ordinary tax case. 
The Capoemans' situation wasn't ordinary because 
there were statutory provisions, relating to allotted 
lands, that arguably exempted their timber income. 
Therefore, the Court examined provisions of the Gen-
eral Allotment Act of 188740 and a 1906 amendment to 
that act41 - enactments that defined the nature of the 
Capoemans' interest in the lands from which the tim-
ber had been taken. The General Allotment Act could 
be interpreted as precluding all taxation of allotted 
land until a patent had been issued. It was only after 
the issuance of a patent that" all restrictions as to sale, 
incumbrance, or taxation of said land shall be 
removed. "42 This language suggested to the Court "a 
congressional intent to subject an Indian allottee to all 
taxes only after a patent in fee is issued to the allot-
tee."43 
Indeed, said the Court, if there was any doubt about 
how the General Allotment Act should be read in these 
circumstances, the canons of construction removed 
that doubt. With the "doubtful expressions" of the Act 
read favorably to the Capoemans,44 no federal tax could 
be imposed on income from the allotted land. More-
over, relying on writings of Indian law scholar Felix 
Cohen, the Court interpreted the exemption to apply 
to "income derived directly" from the land,45 a category 
that included the net proceeds from the timber sales. 
Like Judge Dean in Warbus, the Squire Court ac-
cepted the general proposition that "exemptions to tax 
laws should be clearly expressed."46 .But that proposi-
38Id. at 5-6. 
39Id. at 6. 
4
°Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 25 U.S.C.). 
41Act of May 8, 1906, ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182 (codified at 25 
U.S.C. section 349). 
4225 U.S.C. section 349 (emphasis added). In its nearly full 
form, the proviso to Section 6 of the General Allotment Act, 
as amended, reads as follows: 
That ... ~he Secretary of the Interior may, in his discre-
tion, and he is authorized, whenever he shall be satis-
fied that any Indian allottee is competent and capable 
of managing his or her affairs at any time to cause to 
be issued to such allottee a patent in fee simple, and 
thereafter all restrictions as to sale, incumbrance, or 
taxation of said land shall be removed .... 
43Squire, 351 U.S. at 7. 
44 See Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930). 
45Squire, 351 U.S. at 9 (quoting Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of 
Federal Indian Law 265 (1942)). 
46Id. at 6. 
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tion merely begins the analysis. In an Indian law con-
text, individuals searching for 11 express" exemptions 
must do their research mindful of the canons of con-
struction.47 The Supreme Court in Squire analyzed the 
controlling statutes in a way favorable to the Indian 
taxpayers to see whether an 11 express" exemption ex-
isted; that's what Warbus should have asked the Tax 
Court to do in his case.48 Instead, he punted.49 
I Section 7873 lends itself to good old-fashioned statutory analysis of a sort that tax lawyers do every day. 
All of which brings us to the interpretation of section 
7873, the claimed express exemption in Warbus. I'll 
argue that the canons of construction weren't necessary 
to find an "express" exemption for Warbus's DOl in-
come, since section 7873 is clear enough on its own 
terms. But whether that argument is right or not, the 
canons should have made this an easy case for the 
taxpayer. 
C. Section 7873: Income and 'Activity' 
Section 7873 lends itself to good old-fashioned 
statutory analysis of a sort that tax lawyers do every 
day. 
1. The structure of section 7873. Warbus, Judge Dean 
wrote, "argue[ d) that the purchase of the Denise Wand 
expenditures for associated equipment and operating 
expenses are fishing-rights related and that therefore 
the income from discharge of indebtedness incurred to 
meet these expenses is fishing-rights related."50 
What precisely is the problem with that argument? 
Since the government had conceded that a "fishing 
rights-related activity" existed, the problem had to be 
that Warbus's DOl income was insufficiently con-
nected with that activity. In Judge Dean's words, the 
DOl income was the 
result of the freeing of [Warbus's] assets from 
obligations by the BIA in 1993, not from any ac-
tivity by him 'directly related' to harvesting, 
47The effects of the canons can be tempered in some special 
situations. For example, once Congress acts to clearly make 
land subject to state taxation, reacquisition of the land by a 
tribe will not exempt the land from taxation. Congress must 
make any new exemption "unmistakably clear." Cass County 
v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 118 S. Ct. 1904, 1910, 98 
TNT 110-8 (1998). 
48 Squire, 351 U.S. at 6-8. Particularly when the canons of 
construction are applied, the usual requirement that an ex-
emption from taxation be "express" should not be inter-
preted to mean "beyond any doubt." That someone can come 
up with a different spin on statutory language should not 
mean, by itself, that a provision is not "express." 
49 See Petitioner's Reply Brief at 2-3, Warbus v. Commis-
sioner, 110 T.C. 279 (1998) (No. 2194-96) ("Petitioner Warbus 
agrees that, absent some expressed exemption found in 
statute or treaty, Indians are subject to the federal income tax 
laws the same as any other citizens."). 
50Warbus, 110 T.C. at 282. 
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IIIII 
' I! 
processing, transporting, or selling fish in the exer-
cise of recognized fishing rights of an Indian tribe.51 
This is the passage that I would like to focus on in the 
Warbus opinion. 
To begin with, Judge Dean garbled the statutory 
language. Compare the Warbus quotation, with its refer-
ence to "activity by him" and the quotation marks around 
11 directly related," with the actual language of section 
7873.52 The statute doesn't include the words "by him."53 
As I discuss below, Judge Dean improperly personalized 
the II activity" requirement. Moreover, the "directly re-
lated" phrase that Judge Dean highlighted is merely part 
of the definition of "fishing rights-related activity," and 
that definition wasn't at issue in Warbus. Because the 
government had conceded that a qualifying activity ex-
isted, the only question should have been whether the 
income at issue was "derived ... directly ... from" the 
qualifying activity. None of the language in the quoted 
passage addresses that portion of section 7873. 
Suppose Warbus had been able to show that he pur-
chased the boat, paid expenses, and therefore incurred 
the associated debt only for the purpose of engaging in 
the Lummi Nation's treaty-protected activity. If he could 
have shown that- a position that the government lar-
gely conceded54 - surely that would have been enough 
of a connection to make the DOl income tax-exempt. 
Or would it? If I'm reading the passage from Judge 
Dean's opinion correctly, one of his concerns was the 
relative passivity of the DOl income; for all we know, 
Warbus may have been asleep at the precise moment 
the DOl income was realized. I interpret Judge Dean's 
phrase "from any activity by him" as drawing this ac-
tivity versus passivity distinction. It doesn't matter, 
that is, why the Denise W was acquired and how it was 
used; it doesn't matter why the borrowing occurred. If 
so, Warbus would mean that DOl income can never be 
section 7873 income. 
If that's what he meant, Judge Dean misunderstood 
the word "activity" in section 7873. Return to the 
statutory language: "income derived ... directly ... 
from a fishing rights-related activity."55 The "activity" 
51Id. at 283 (note omitted). 
52 See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text. 
53ln another part of the opinion, Judge Dean used lan-
guage almost identical to the language quoted above, but 
without the nonstatutory phrase "by him." See Warbus, 110 
T.C. at 283. 
54 See Respondent's Brief in Answer at 12-13, Warbus v. 
Commissioner, 110 T.C. 279 (1998) (No. 2194-96) (citations 
omitted): 
It is not disputed in this case that Petitioner ob-
tained the $50,000 loan, which the BIA satisfied in 1993, 
primarily to obtain funds for use in Petitioner's treaty 
fishing rights-related activity. It is not disputed that 
the Denise W, the asset which secured this $50,000 loan, 
was utilized in Petitioner's treaty fishing rights-related 
activity. Further, it is not disputed that Petitioner was 
engaged in a treaty fishing rights-related activity from 
1986 to 1991, the time during which the Denise W was 
operated by petitioner. 
55Section 7873(a)(1). 
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required by the statute is the "fishing rights-related 
activity," which includes "harvesting, processing, or 
transporting fish harvested in the exercise of a recog-
nized fishing right."56 The statutory language is as 
clear as it can be that the required "activity" is the 
overall structure of treaty-protected behavior that a 
tribe engages in and from which tribal members derive 
income: "from a fishing rights-related activity of such 
tribe."57 The requirement that there be such an activity 
was satisfied in Warbus; the government had conceded 
the point for the Lummi Nation. 
In the passage quoted above, Judge Dean would 
instead have us ask whether the income was "from any 
activity by [Warbus] ... 'directly related' to a [treaty-
protected activity]." That's too much activity for me,58 
and it's more activity than section 7873 requires. By 
mixing up the "activity" requirement and the "income 
derived directly" requirement of section 7873, Judge 
Dean effectively rewrote the statutory provision. Sec-
tion 7873 focuses on the connection of the income with 
the protected activity, not on whether the particular 
taxpayer is doing physical activity at the time an item 
of income is earned or an expenditure is made. 
By mixing up the 'activity' requirement 
and the 'income derived directly' 
requirement of section 7873, Judge 
Dean effectively rewrote the statutory 
provision. 
2. The meaning of 'activity' in other code sections. 
Judge Dean's conception of the term "activity" doesn't 
fit section 7873, and it's not supported by the way the 
term is used elsewhere in the code.59 To make that 
point, I'll discuss the oxymoronic passive activity loss 
(PAL) rules of section 469, enacted in 1986, only two 
years before the passage of section 7873, and the at-risk 
rules of section 465, enacted in 1976 but significantly 
extended in 1986.60 These two sections were the 
56Section 7873(b )(1). 
57 Section 7873( a)(1 ). 
58I agree with the statement usually attributed, probably 
erroneously, to Robert Maynard Hutchins: "Every time I 
think about exercise, I lie down until the thought passes." 
59Judge Dean made no reference to the term's use else-
where. This failure (and it is a failure) wasn't entirely his 
fault. As with the canons of construction, he received no help 
from the parties. On the other ·hand, interpreting code lan-
guage is part of his job. 
60Whatever the empirical validity of the assumption that 
members of Congress have any know ledge of the language 
used in other code provisions, that assumption is made all 
the time by courts. See, e.g., Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 
486 U.S. 174, 184-85 (1988) ("We generally presume that Con-
gress is knowledgeable about existing law pertinent to the 
legislation it enacts."). This is an assumption that seems par-
ticularly appropriate when a term, like "activity," was used 
in 1988 legislation, only two years after it was a centerpiece 
of the widely noted PAL rules. 
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primary, and largely successful, weapons used against 
abusive tax shelters. 
I'm going to try, as simply as possible, to show that 
use of the term "activity" in an Internal Revenue Code 
provision doesn't necessarily mean that a taxpayer 
must be engaged in vigorous exercise to be subject to 
the statute. Indeed, the PAL rules would make no sense 
with such a requirement. To have an interest in a pas-
sive activity, and therefore to be subject to section 469, 
requires that a taxpayer not be personally active.61 The 
at-risk rules also were intended to attack certain loss-
generating investments, denominated "activities," in 
which investors were likely to be personally inactive. 
a. Passive activity loss (PAL) rules. Suppose a tax-
payer-doctor has a loss attributable to his interest as 
limited partner in a limited partnership that engages 
in a trade or business. There is, by definition, activity 
going on, but the taxpayer doesn't participate very 
much, if at all, in the activity. That's the quintessential 
interest in a passive activity, a trade or business in 
which the taxpayer doesn't materially participate,62 
and that's the sort of loss-generating investment sec-
tion 469 addresses. 
Section 469 made losses from passive "activities" 
much less valuable than they had been under pre-Tax 
Reform Act of 1986law, in that such losses can be used 
only to offset income from passive activities.63 The doc-
tor can't use his PALs to currently offset his active 
income from medical practice, nor can he use the pas-
sive losses to offset his portfolio income - the divi-
dends, in~erest, and so on he earns from his invest-
ments.64 He can carry the currently unusable losses 
forward to use when he has generated additional pas-
sive activity income65 but, all other things being equal, 
deferred losses aren't as valuable as currently usable 
ones. By limiting the utility of PALs, section 469 made 
investments in loss-generating passive activities much 
less attractive than had been the case before 1986.66 
610f course, taxpayers generally don't want to be subject 
to section 469: those with losses don't want the losses limited 
by the PAL rules. But a taxpayer with PALs that would other-
wise not be currently deductible wants income to be charac-
terized as coming from a passive activity. 
62Section 469(c)(1). Material participation is defined in sec-
tion 469(h)(1). Interests in limited partnerships are presump-
tively interests in passive activities. Section 469(h)(2). 
63Section 469(a)(1) disallows the deduction of a "passive ac-
tivity loss," which is defined as the excess of losses from passive 
activities over income from passive activities. Section 469(d)(1). 
The effect is that losses from passive activities may be deducted 
currently to offset any income from passive activities. 
64Section 469(e)(1) defines such income as not being from 
a passive activity. 
65Section 469(b ). When a taxpayer disposes of substantial-
ly his entire interest in a passive activity in a fully taxable 
transaction, (e.g., by selling the limited partnership interest), 
he can then deduct the previously suspended losses. Section 
469(g)(1) (defining such losses as not from a passive activity). 
66As a result, doctors won't passively invest in such ac-
tivities to generate losses to offset their medical income. Sec-
tion 469 has been so effective because it has largely 
eliminated the objectionable behavior to which the provision 
would otherwise apply. 
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Now suppose our hypothetical limited partnership 
recognizes some DOl income associated with the trade 
or business it conducts. The doctor's limited partner-
ship interest remains an interest in a passive activity. 
Can DOl income attributable to such a passive ac-
tivity be income from a passive activity to our 
hypothetical limited partner? Absolutely, if the connec-
tion with the passive activity is shown. 67 That is, the 
income can be associated with an activity even though 
the taxpayer is completely inactive; that's the nature of 
income from a passive activity.68 And that's one of the 
lessons to transfer to the analysis of section 7873. 
I In Judge Dean's defense, there are facts in Warbus that could reasonably have given the court pause on the statutory interpretation issue. 
DOl income is neither inherently active nor in-
herently passive; its character under section 469 
depends on the nature of the activity to which it's 
allocated. That characterization has almost nothing to 
do with the extent of the actual efforts involved in 
generating the DOl income. Under the PAL rules, the 
extent of a taxpayer's participation is significant in 
determining whether his interest is a passive activity 
- does he materially participate? - but the charac-
terization of a particular item of income or loss isn't 
determined by looking at the taxpayer's level of effort 
with respect to that item. It's simply, or sometimes not 
so simply, a matter of determining whether the income 
is attributable to the passive, or non-passive, activity. 
b. At-risk rules. Another example of the use of," ac-
tivity" can be found in the at-risk rules of section 465, 
Congress's first attack on tax shelters. In general, sec-
tion 465 limits a taxpayer's ability to take deductions 
relating to an" activity" to the amount that the taxpayer 
has "at risk" in the activity. 69 As is true with the PAL 
rules, the at-risk rules make certain sorts of deductions 
67See Rev. Rul. 92-92, 1992-2 C.B. 103 (discussing allocation 
of DOl income between passive activity expenditures and 
other expenditures); cf LTR 9522008, 95 TNT 108-24 (holding 
DOl income to be investment income on the facts). The focus 
is allocation "at the time indebtedness is discharged." Char-
acterization of income as passive would generally be a good 
thing for taxpayers who have otherwise nondeductible PALs. 
See supra note 61. 
68Would DOl income attributable to an activity not be 
income from a passive activity if the taxpayer materially 
participates in the activity? Again the answer is yes. DOl 
income can clearly be treated as income from a "trade or 
business," a term that presupposes the existence of activity. 
Section 108, which provides for special deferral rules for DOl 
income in special circumstances, assumes that DOI income 
can be associated with a trade or business. 
69Section 465(a)(1). Taxpayers are generally at risk for the 
amount of cash and the adjusted basis of property contrib-
uted to the activity, and for the amount of borrowing for 
which they are personally liable. Taxpayers generally aren't 
at risk for amounts borrowed on a nonrecourse basis. See 
section 465(b), (c). 
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much less valuable than used to be the case (in general, 
deductions attributable to nonrecourse debt and other 
risk-limiting arrangements used in almost all abusive tax 
shelters).70 One doesn't avoid being subject to section 
465's limitations by arguing th~t one is inactive. In addi-
tion, income, including DOl income, can be attributable 
to an "activity" even though a particular taxpayer's ef-
forts in the activity are minimal or nonexistent. 
The relevant determination under the PAL and at-risk 
rules is whether the DOl income relates to an "activity." 
The question isn't whether the particular taxpayer 
engaged in a certain level of activity wjth respect to that 
one income item. There's no apparent reason why the 
same analysis shouldn't apply under section 7873. 
3. Connection of DOl income with the Lummi Nation 
'activity.' We know that there was a "fishing rights-
related activity" in Warbus, since the government con-
ceded that point. The appropriate question, the only 
question, should have been whether the DOl income 
was "derived ... directly ... from" that activity, not 
whether Warbus was "active" in generating the DOl 
income. 
It wouldn't strain the statutory language at all to see 
DOl income attributable to the foreclosure of a fishing 
boat acquired for use in a "fishing rights-related ac-
tivity" as being "derived directly from" that activity, 
just as DOl income can be income from a passive ac-
tivity. If that was Warbus's situation, and it is consis-
tent with what we know of the facts/1 he should have 
won. Such an interpretation of section 7873 wouldn't 
create serious opportunities for manipulation by mem-
bers of treaty-protected tribes; the connection between 
the DOl income in Warbus and the protected activity 
was hardly imaginary.72 And it wouldn't create tax 
shelter opportunities that Wall Street could take ad-
vantage o£.73 
70This isn't to say that nonrecourse debt is necessarily 
abusive. It is to say that abusive shelters routinely used non-
recourse debt, or what purported to be nonrecourse debt. 
71 See supra note 54. 
72The government emphasized that section 7873 should 
not be used to confer "tax-free status on other income derived 
by Indians from other sources." Respondent's Brief in 
Answer at 12, Warbus v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 279 (1998) (No. 
2194-96) (quoting Hearings on S. 1239 Before the Subcomm. 
on Taxation and Debt Management of the Senate Comm. of 
Finance, 100th Cong. 13 (1988) (statement of Dennis E. Ross, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy)). 
That principle is unobjectionable as a general matter, but it's 
hard to see how holding this DOl income exempt - income 
from foreclosure of a fishing boat - would create oppor-
tunities to exempt income from other sources. 
73 At least I don't think it would, but one should never 
underestimate the creativity of tax planners: "The tax bar is 
the repository of the greatest ingenuity in America, and given 
the chance, those people will do you in." Legislation Relating 
to Tax-Motivated Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the 
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 97th Cong. 90 (1982) 
(testimony of Martin D. Ginsburg) (quoted in Jonathan L. 
Entin, "Privacy, Emotional Distress, and the Limits of Libel 
Law Reform," 38 Mercer L. Rev. 835, 835 (1987)). 
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One shouldn't interpret the "derived directly from" 
language in section 7873, particularly when read with 
the canons of construction, as requiring an impossibly 
difficult showing of a connection between the income 
at issue and the protected activity. That wasn't the 
purpose behind the language. It was intended to re-
quire allocation between exempt income and non-ex-
empt income - not all fishing income is necessarily 
exempt to a tribal member- not to impose insuperable 
burdens of proof. 
The Senate Report on the Technical and Miscel-
laneous Revenue Act of 1988,74 which included the new 
section 7873, notes that the act "exempts only that in-
come 'derived' from fishing rights-related activities. 
Thus, ... individual tribal members ... are required 
under the bill to allocate income and expenses among 
fishing rights-related activities and all other ac-
tivities."75 Fair enough: the "directly derived" rule is 
an allocation rule, not a burden of proof provision. Life 
is made up of activities, and it's necessary to allocate 
income items, like DOI income, among those ac-
tivities.76 
The report then contains an example of when alloca-
tion is required: 
If ... an individual tribal member derives 60 
percent of his or her gross income in a taxable 
year from fishing in protected waters and the 
remaining 40 percent from fishing outside 
protected waters, then 60 percent of the member's 
income would be exempt from tax ... , and any 
expenses ... attributable to such exempt income 
could not be used to offset gross income derived 
from fishing outside prohibited waters or any 
other income. 77 
If Warbus had used the Denise W in part for treaty-
protected fishing, and in part for other purposes, then 
some of the. DOI income should not have been exempt. 
But except for one obscure footnote78 in a Senate 
Finance Committee report, a footnote that is hardly 
controlling, nothing in the statutory language or the 
legislative history suggests that all $13,506 of DOI in-
come should have been automatically taxable.79 
74Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3342 (codified at scattered 
sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
75S. Rep. No. 100-445, at 475 (1988). 
76Which is to say that DOl income is attributable to some 
activity. 
77S. Rep. No. 100-445, supra note 75, at 475. 
78To fans of footnotes, "obscure footnote" isn't redundant. 
79The footnote stated that an entity should not fail the 90 
percent test to be a "qualified Indian entity" in a particular 
year "solely by reason of extraordinary and nonrecurring 
events, such as the sale of a boat or other property." S. Rep. 
No. 100-445, supra note 75, at 474 n.141. The 90 percent test 
provides, in general, that a qualified Indian entity must 
derive 90 percent or more of its annual gross receipts "from 
fishing rights-related activities of one or more qualified In-
dian tribes." Section 7873(b )(3)(A)(iii); see also supra note 22 
(discussing qualified Indian entities). Treating boat sales spe-
cially was necessary, argued the government, because net 
sales proceeds were understood not to be "from fishing 
(Footnote 79 continued in next column.) 
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Perhaps there are weak spots in this analysis; 
lawyers can pick holes in almost any argument. But 
with the canons of construction as reinforcements, I'm 
confident that any manufactured doubts should have 
been resolved favorably to Warbus. The Supreme Court 
in Squire v. Capoeman interpreted similar "derived 
directly" language liberally (although, in that case, a 
phrase interpreting statutory language rather than a 
phrase taken from the controlling statute) to hold some 
of a tribal member's income exempt from federal in-
come taxation.80 
I The opinion in Warbus is an inherently incomplete analysis. That fact by itself should give us pause in relying on the Warbus opinion in future cases. 
In Judge Dean's defense, there are facts in Warbus 
that could reasonably have given the court pause on 
the statutory interpretation issue. The borrowing oc-
curred in 1984, a couple of years before Warbus par-
ticipated in the fishing activity of the tribe. Perhaps 
that's a significant fact although, if so, one wishes that 
the judge would have explained its significance.81 In 
rights-related activities." Without the special rule, a boat sale 
could therefore have disqualified an otherwise qualified en-
tity. If boat ~ales proceeds are not section 7873 income, the 
government continued, neither is income attributable to a 
boat's foreclosure. Respondent's Brief in Answer at 12-13, 
Warbus v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 279 (1998) (No. 2194-96). 
The government's argument has some force, but it gives 
much too much weight to what is, after all, a footnote in a 
report on a tangential issue. The purpose of the 90 percent 
test is to determine whether an entity is a qualified Indian 
entity; it has nothing to do with whether an individual's 
income is attributable to treaty activity. In addition, the 
footnote's purpose is to suggest that, consistent with the 
canons, the apparently aU-or-nothing test to be a qualified 
Indian entity should not be applied in a draconian way. It 
would turn the canons on their head to use this passage to 
restrict exemption under section 7873. Finally, for what it's 
worth, gain from the sale of an asset and DOl income are not 
the same thing. Cf section 108(a) (permitting deferral of DOl 
income but not gain in some circumstances). 
80 See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
81Maybe he did so indirectly. Judge Dean noted that 
even had petitioner's loan proceeds been income in the 
first instance in 1984 [i.e., the year of borrowing], their 
source was not activity directly related to harvesting, 
processing, transporting, or selling fish in the exercise 
of recognized fishing rights of an Indian tribe. Forgive-
ness of the repayment of those loan proceeds by a third 
party cannot convert the freeing of petitioner's assets 
into fishing-rights-related income merely because the 
loan proceeds were used to purchase equipment used 
in such an activity. 
Warbus, 110 T.C. at 284. Putting aside the judge's continued 
conflation of the "derived directly from" and the "activity" 
tests, I suppose that passage can be interpreted as attaching 
significance to the fact that the borrowing preceded Warbus' s 
participation in the tribal fishing activity: that is, the borrow-
(Footnote 81 continued on next page.) 
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addition? the DOI income was not recognized until 
1993f a couple of years after Warbus had ceased par-
ticipating in the activity. Perhaps that too is a relevant 
fact (although, again, one would like to know why).82 
III. A Final Canon Shot 
As I read section 7873, Warbus had good arguments 
in support of his position even without the canons of 
construction. If we apply the canons, as we're obligated 
to do, the result is an easy one: DOI income arising 
from the foreclosure of a boat used in a treaty-protected 
fishing activity is exempt. 
A skeptical reader might suggest that the canons 
should not have been applied in Warbus because the 
section 7873 issue was not a typical "Indian rights" 
question. It was a tribal member rather than the Lummi 
Nation who would have benefitted directly by a differ-
ent result in the case. 
I'm not persuaded. 
Section 7873 deals with traditional, treaty-protected 
tribal rights; applying the statute in a narrow way to 
a tribal member inevitably affects the economic well-
being of the tribe. And it's not as though the canons 
have been applied only in cases in which tribal rights 
have been directly implicated. As we've seenf the 
Supreme Court, in its most important case discussing 
the federal income tax liability of individual Indiansf 
Squire v. Capoeman,83 applied the canons as a matter of 
routine.84 
In any eventf as far as I can tell, Warbus wasn't the 
result of a principled determination that the canons were 
irrelevant. No such determination could have been made; 
the judge wasn't aware of the canons' existence. 
ing, had it otherwise been taxable, would not have been 
protected by section 7873 (which didn't exist in 1984); a later 
discharge of the indebtedness therefore shouldn't escape 
taxation. Even if that's what Judge Dean meant, he wasn't 
necessarily right. The DOl income must be analyzed under 
section 7873. The income was not realized until1993; since it 
wasn't "secured as of March 17, 1988," it was not governed 
by pre-1988 act law. See Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue 
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, section 3044(b), 102 Stat. 
3342, 3642 (codified at 26 U.S.C. section 7873 (quoting lan-
guage of 1988 act, section 3044(b)). 
82Surely DOl income attributable to a taxpayer's passive 
activity would continue to be income from a passive activity 
even if it were recognized after the underlying trade or busi-
ness ceased. Cf. section 469(f)(1) (permitting carried-over 
deductions from a former passive activity- e.g., because the 
taxpayer's level of participation has increased - to offset 
income from the no-longer-passive activity). 
83 See supra notes 36-48 and accompanying text. 
84Although the tribal members lost in each case, the 
canons were nominally applied in the pre-section 7873 cases 
considering the federal income taxation of income derived 
from treaty-protected fishing. See supra note 35. 
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The failure to apply the canons may not have been 
Judge Dean's fault, but it was a failing. As a result, the 
opinion in Warbus is an inherently incomplete analysis. 
That fact by itself should give us pause in relying on 
the War bus opinion in future ~cases. 
IV. Conclusion 
The world isn't necessarily made up of purely 
American Indian law cases or purely tax cases. Some-
times apparently discrete bodies of law intersect, and 
courts, practitioners, and scholars must deal with that 
overlap. Warbus should have been such a case. 
Unfortunately, counsel for Warbus merely noted the 
"intersection of Indian Law with Tax Law"85 and then 
did little or nothing to help Judge Dean deal with that 
intersection. It wouldn't have taken much. A 
boilerplate recitation of the canons of construction 
would have helped alert the judge to the American 
Indian law implications of the case. 
I'm not sure why Warbus turned into such a disaster. 
Part of the problem, I suspect, is that it was not a big 
dollar case. The tax due on $13,506 of income, after 
taking into account the effects of standard deductions, 
personal exemptions, and low marginal rates, is very 
small. A case of this sort will therefore not elicit the 
legal effort that the larger issues might justify, and 
some of the technical issues w:ould have taken substan-
tial time to develop. 
On the other hand, very little effort was necessary 
to get the American Indian law issues on the table. If 
nothing elsef Warbus illustrates the dangers in having 
individual Indians litigating issues that affect larger, 
tribal interests. Section 7873 has important effects on 
tribal members who engage in protected fishing, but 
the ultimate beneficiaries are the tribes. Exempting 
members' income from federal income taxation 
promotes the economic position of tribes. War bus's in-
adequate arguments led to an incredibly limited under-
standing of the income eligible for exemption, and it's 
tribal interests that will suffer if Warbus is taken 
seriously as precedent. 
Obviously the Warbus opinion cannot be airbrushed 
out of the legal picture;86 it's there in print (and on line) 
for us to ponder and criticize. But we should get as 
close as we possibly can to the effect of airbrushing: 
the next time a court hears a section 7873 issue it should 
act as if Warbus had never been decided. 
85Petitioner's Reply Brief at 3, Warbus v. Commissioner, 110 
T.C. 279 (1998) (No. 2194-96). 
86Cf. David King, The Commissar Vanishes: The Falsification 
of Photographs and Art in Stalin's Russia (1997). 
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